Peng-Hsiang Wang
Democratic Legitimacy under Epistemic Uncertainty
Abstract: The standard account of epistemic democracy holds that the epistemic aim of democracy is to track the truth, where truth refers to some procedure-independent standard of correctness. On this account, the legitimacy of democracy derives from its ability to generate correct outcomes. However, democratic decision-making typically takes place in circumstances of epistemic uncertainty, where participants often lack sufficiently robust knowledge of decision-relevant empirical and normative facts, thereby remaining uncertain about them and about what should be done. How, then, can democratic decision-making be legitimate if it relies on uncertain empirical or normative premises that might undermine the correctness of outcomes?
This lecture addresses the problem of democratic legitimacy under epistemic uncertainty by challenging the standard account of epistemic deliberative democracy. Based on a justificationist view of political legitimacy, I argue that the primary epistemic aim of deliberative democracy, at least in the circumstances of epistemic uncertainty, is to reach rationally justified decisions rather than to track procedure-independent correct outcomes. My argument consists of three main steps.
First, epistemic uncertainty entails that our beliefs about decision-relevant empirical and normative facts, due to our ignorance or limited knowledge, leave room for error. If the justification of political decisions depends on uncertain beliefs that are liable to be false, justified decisions cannot reliably track truth or correctness. Epistemic uncertainty thus drives a wedge between justification and truth, thereby challenging the truth-tracking potential of democratic decision-making processes.
Second, in light of this gap between justification and truth, democratic decisions are legitimate only if they are the outcomes of a decision-making process that adheres to specific epistemic norms of political deliberation. One of these norms allows us to use justified beliefs, rather than knowledge or truth, to justify political decisions. Accordingly, democratic legislatures may base their decisions on uncertain empirical or normative premises, provided these premises are justifiable on the available evidence. Democratic decision-making that relies on uncertain beliefs is not irrational, because what we ought rationally to do depends on our beliefs about decision-relevant facts rather than on the objective facts themselves.
Third, I examine the problem of reasonable practical disagreements arising from epistemic uncertainty, which often manifests in epistemic peer disagreements over decision-relevant empirical or normative premises. Since suspending judgment is not a feasible way for democratic legislatures to resolve such disagreements, they must choose between conflicting but equally justifiable beliefs to justify their decisions. Although such choices are arbitrary in that they rest on epistemically irrelevant considerations, I will argue that this arbitrariness is acceptable insofar as it is constrained by the structural requirement of rational justification.
Keywords: epistemic democracy, epistemic uncertainty, political legitimacy, epistemic norms, rationality, reasonable disagreements
Peng-Hsiang WANG: Deputy Director & Research Professor, Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica,
Taipei, Taiwan
(Revised on 11 November 2025)
Akiko Nozaki
Normative Relationship in Liberalism
The state, based on modern law, aspires to a free society, and it is the role of the state to construct and operate a legal system that promotes respect of the individual. The realization of a free society depends on society respecting individuals who are “no one other than themselves”. While it is a necessary condition that individuals are treated as free agents, it is the responsibility of the state to create the institutional framework.
This presentation is part of a liberal project that aims to present a theoretical conception of normative relationships based on the idea of “respect of individuals for others”. This project is in line with modern legal thought in that it starts with the respect of the individual, and it may not be particularly new in that it is based on the idea of a free society. However, previous research has not fully examined the unnamed concept that has been incorporated into modern legal systems but has never been verbalized. This unnamed concept is related to the normative obligations that arise in the relationship between “those who have faced each other”.
In examining this issue, this presentation will focus on the “edges of life,” birth and death. Everyone begins and ends at these stages. At these stagers, no one can exist solely through their own will and actions. The core issue of recognizing others as legal persons equal to oneself and respecting others as equal beings is most clearly revealed at these stages. For example, consider the issue of regulating the use of assisted reproductive technology or the issue of regulating end-of-life care. We need to carefully consider how to view the relationship between the fetus and the pregnant woman, or the relationship between the patient at the end of life and their family and other concerned parties, and how to justify legal regulations in these stages. These issues must be evaluated from the perspective of normative relational theory.
Individual specific questions have their own particularities and there are no universally applicable answers, but theory has the responsibility to provide a path for consideration, a perspective to be adopted, and questions to be formed. At the same time, it also provides an opportunity to explore whether it is possible to comprehensively elucidate practical issues from a theoretical perspective that is detached from specific problems. This is the essence of the mutual penetration (interaction) of theory and practice.
Issues related to the human experience from birth to death are aspects that require support for life maintenance and the maintenance of bodily functions. This phenomenon is an unavoidable part of our human destiny, so we need to create an environment that allows us to be aware of it. In a just society, individuals have a special, unilateral, positive duty towards specific others who are facing such situations. In normative relational theory, when examining issues in this area, we do not consider them to be exceptional or peripheral problems within the legal framework. Rather, we recognize the fundamental importance of these issues in forming the foundations of a free society.
Keywords: liberalism, respect of the individual, edges of life, special positive duty
Professor Akiko NOZAKI: Faculty of Law, Dokkyo University, Soka, Japan